Optimal regulation of specialized medical care in a mixed system by Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás et al.
Optimal Regulation of Specialized Medical Care in a
Mixed System
1
Nicolas Porteiro Fresco
2
November 8, 2000
1
I am very grateful to Ines Macho-Stadler for her help and support. I also would like to
thank Paula Gonzalez, Carmen Matutes, Jorge Mestre, Pau Olivella, David Perez-Castrillo and
Angel M. Vera for their helpful comments. Financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya
(grant 1998FI 00020) and from the Spanish Ministry of Education (project DGES PB 97-0181)
is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are my own responsability.
2
I.D.E.A. Dept. d'Economia i d'Historia Economica. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
Bellaterra 08193 (Barcelona). Spain. Phone: (34) 93 581 1811. Fax: (34) 93 581 2012. E-mail:
porteiro@idea.uab.es
Abstract
We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for
specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training
allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly
rents. Our aim is to characterize the most eÆcient regulation in this eld taking into
account dierent regulatory frameworks. We nd that the existing situation in some
countries, in which the amount of specialization is controlled, and the costs of this process
of specialization are publicly nanced, can be supported as the best possible intervention.
JEL Classication: D80, I11, I18, L51.
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1 Introduction
According to the denition given by the Modern English Dictionary, a specialist is: \one
who devotes himself to a particular branch of a science, art or profession; authority in one
particular subject". This denition can be directly applied to the case of medical practice;
the physicians pass through a highly requiring process of training prior to the execution
of their work, and this training gives them a particular ability to perform their task. The
formation the specialists receive increases the quality of the services they oer. It makes
it more likely that they can heal the disease treated.
In this paper we analyze the rationality for regulating the formation of specialized
physicians, considering both, the social welfare and the aspect of monopoly power that
their knowledge gives them. Our aim is to analyze the eÆciency of the existing regulation
in some countries.
To better understand the problem that we deal with, we rst explain the steps that
have to be taken to become a specialized physician in most countries. After the under-
graduate studies of Medicine, a selection process is made among those who have their
bachelor degree. In Spain, for example, those who perform better have priority to choose
their eld of specialization. Then the real specialized training starts. This phase is mainly
made in hospitals where the individuals combine both theoretical learning with the real
treatment of diseases. In Spain the program in which the physicians are formed is called
MIR (\Medico Interno Residente", i.e., \Internal Resident Physician"), in most OECD
countries the process of specialization follows a similar pattern.
There are two important elements of these specialization programs that we want to
highlight because they are the motivation for our analysis. On the one hand, we want
to emphasize that the \amount of specialization" required to become a specialized physi-
cian is completely regulated, each speciality has its own xed requirements and no one
with less than the required training on his eld is allowed to work as a specialist; in
fact, recently there has been a lot of controversity because the Spanish government is
studying the possibility of letting some physicians who have not undertaken the oÆcial
process of specialization, but have followed alternative qualication programs, to perform
as \specialists".
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On the other hand, it is important to notice the high subsidies that exist for specialized
medical education, aspect that was considered as a \remarkable feature" of the market
for medical care in the early work by Arrow [1]. Those physicians who enter the program
are paid a wage all the way through their process of training. Notice that this system
supposes that not only the direct costs of specialization are subsidized (the physicians do
not pay for the training they receive); their opportunity costs (or at least a share of these
costs) are also covered, as they earn a wage while they are being formed as specialists.
To sum up, we are interested in the situation in which a minimal amount of special-
ization is xed by regulation (in fact, this can be understood as the implementation of
a minimum quality standard), and its associated costs are subsidized. The existence of
this kind of regulation can be supported by the consideration of medical care as a \social
good" or as Pauly [2] says, as an \object of social concern" deserving a special treatment.
Nevertheless, we want to study the impact of the regulation on the market interaction
and on the appropriation of consumers' surplus by the specialized physicians. We con-
sider the value of specialization as generating welfare, but also as an investment that gives
monopoly power to the specialist. To introduce both aspects in the model, we consider a
mixed public-private system of provision of health care, where the specialized physicians
are providers on the two sides: they work for the public system, but they also oer their
services as private specialists. For a general presentation of the alternative systems of
provision of health care see Besley and Gouveia [3].
For the role of health in the social welfare, we concentrate on the patients' health
conditions. We assume that the patients face one disease, and although they have a
guess, they cannot be sure about the specic type they suer. The patients have two
possibilities: they can decide to go to the public health system, and face no pecuniary
costs (we assume there is no copayment for simplicity, but the analysis can be extended
to include this possibility without altering the qualitative results), but in this case they
have to visit compulsorily the general practitioner. This physician acts as a lter (in
the literature, gatekeeper) by sending to the specialist only those patients who need it.
The general practitioner also has an important role in the elimination of the uncertainty,
because he recognizes the type of illness and recommends the appropriate specialist. The
other possibility the patients have is to go directly to a private specialist and pay the fee
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he sets. In this case, they may incur in an additional cost associated with misrecognizing
the symptoms and choosing the wrong doctor. The model dened this way, replicates the
actual situation in countries like Italy or Spain.
We will assume that the specialists' work in the public system is fully regulated. On
the contrary, we consider that they have control over their services as private providers.
In this decision we will assume that the physicians act corporately and therefore there is
not price competition among them. This brings to place the importance of the medical
associations. These associations not only oer the possibility to undertake \prociency"
courses, or as diusers of new advances and recommendations, but also seem to have
an important role in the determination of the pricing policy. This view is supported for
example by Zweifel and Eichenberger [4], who analyze the importance of corporatism in
medicine. They argue that the main aim of the medical associations is collusive, they try
to protect the physicians' earnings, through the control of prices and quantities.
The main result we obtain is that, under the plausible assumption that the physicians
choose the amount of private demand they serve, the optimal regulation consists of a
centralized selection of the level of specialization and a complete public payment of the
associated costs of formation. We also characterize the opposite impact of the presence
of uncertainty on the specialization choice, for the physicians and for the regulator. This
allows us to spot the possible presence of overspecialization in the scenario where the
specialists are allowed to select their level of qualication.
The existing literature on this topic is scarce because, although an enormous amount of
research on quality regulation has been undertaken, hardly any of those papers addresses
the question of the physicians quality, understood as their degree of specialization. Rizzo
and Sindlear [5] consider the regulation of the physicians services in a model with multiple
regulatory agencies. They study the possible presence of coordination failures among the
agencies and their impact on welfare. Other papers, like Paul [6], try to test empirically
the eects on the quality of the provision of medical services of the adoption of licensure
laws. He states that such regulations seem to be driven more by the interest of the
physicians in the protection of their high returns, than by an attempt to raise the quality
of the services given. His model does not enter in conict with our analysis as we will not
consider licensing but the acquisition of the quality required to perform their task.
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Wolinsky [7] studies the eects of information asymmetries in a market with experts,
and explicitly quotes the specialized provision of medical care as one of that markets. He
analyzes the strategic behavior of the providers and the optimal response of the consumers
in a setting with costly searching. He specically focuses in two scenarios, one with
reputation concerns, and other one with experts' liability. Although the spirit of the
model is very close to ours, we do not deal with strategic incentives in the physicians'
decisions, while we concentrate on the optimal public intervention in the market.
Specialization can also be understood as a quality choice. The general eects of the
monopoly power in the quality choice are studied in the classic work by Mussa and Rossen
[8]. They show how a monopolist will have incentives to serve less consumers as compared
to the competitive solution, and that it will do it at a lower than the competitive quality.
This distortion is also present in our work although dierently due to the special nature
of the good exchanged in market for medical care, where the patients buy one unit (of
medical services) and only ask for more if this rst unit does not heal them. Besanko
et al. [9] compare dierent remedies to the quality distortion of the monopoly situation.
They nd that the introduction by the regulator of Minimum Quality Standards will
generate the exclusion of more consumers from the market, and that its welfare eects
are ambiguous. Constantatos and Perrakis [10] also study the eects of Minimum Quality
Standards but in a sequential setting, where the rms have to choose rst whether to enter
the market or not. They show that the welfare eects of the quality regulation depend
crucially on the timing of the quality decision with respect to the entry one. In our model
the sequentiality is also present, although in a dierent way, because the physicians are
already established, but they make their decisions after the regulator's choice.
Finally, specialization can also be seen from a technologic perspective, considering that
the level of specialization is in fact a technology choice. This approach is taken by Barros
[11], but his aim is dierent from ours. He shows how ineÆciencies in technology adoption
may result from intermediate technology providers' decisions (aspect that we do not treat
here).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3, we develop the analysis of the optimal regulation under dierent scenarios.
Finally, Section 4 concludes by remarking the contributions of this article, its shortcomings
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and the room for future research on the topic. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are three sets of agents in this economy: a continuum of potential patients, the
physicians and the regulator. All are risk neutral.
The size of the population of potential patients is normalized to one. This population
is homogeneous except for their health status, that is dened by two aspects, severity and
type of illness. Their utility function is dened in terms of wealth (Y ), and on the health
loss.
The patients suer one of two specic types of diseases (that for simplicity we con-
sider ex-ante equally probable). The severity of the diseases is measured by x, and it is
distributed according to a density function f(x) dened on [0; 1]; that for convenience we
assume to be uniform. This severity variable reects not only the diÆculty to be healed
but also the disutility (measured in monetary terms) that the patients face when they are
ill. Finally, we assume they are perfectly aware that they are ill, and perceive their sever-
ity (the actual realization of x). However, the patients do not perfectly recognize the type
of illness they suer. Specically, we assume that when they are ill, they misrecognize
their symptoms with a given probability  2 [0;
1
2
). The interpretation of this \mistake
probability" is the following: the signal the agents receive when they are ill has to be
informative, hence if ex-ante the two illnesses were equally likely, now the patients must
have a more accurate prediction of the type of their disease. However, this perception may
not be perfect, thus there exists a probability of misrecognizing the type. Notice, that this
assumption tries to capture the fact that certain diseases have very similar symptoms, for
instance, a headache can be caused by a vision problem or be related with the brain, a
pain in the back can be muscular or caused by the vertebrae.
In our economy two dierent types of physicians coexist. On the one hand, there are
General Practitioners, (GP's hereinafter) who have a low degree of specialization in each
eld, but who can treat patients of every possible kind of illness. On the other hand,
the specialists have a more specic training on their eld, but are not prepared to treat
patients with other diseases. In the model by Wolinsky [7], the low specialized providers
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(the equivalent to the GP's here), do not have the advantage of being prepared to oer a
wider range of services than the high qualied specialists.
Notice that due to the fact that we have assumed that the patients make mistakes
when assessing which disease they suer, the GP's are not simply less qualied physicians.
When they see a patient (no matter the type of illness she has) they will not only treat
her up to their qualication, but also they will send her to the correct specialist, vanishing
the uncertainty about the kind of disease. Finally, as we are interested in the behavior of
the specialists, we will consider the GP's as completely passive agents. In other models
of GP's versus specialists, the specialized provision of health care is considered passive,
because these models study the optimal referral policy and its impact on the diagnosis
eort of the GP's, (see for example Garc

ia-Mari~noso and Jelovac [12]).
There is a minimum level of \quality" that all specialists have. This minimum level
of qualication is assumed to be obtained prior to the starting point of the model. It
coincides with the specialization of the general practitioners in this specic eld, and will
be represented by g. The value of g cannot be very high, for analytical convenience, we
specically assume g 
1
2
: The specialized physicians incur in costs to obtain a higher
ability than the GP's. The specialization they get is denoted by s 2 (g; 1).
We assume that the costs of specialization are linear, with parameter k > 0. We
want to study a mixed system, where private provision exists, therefore we will dene
the upper bound for the domain of k, hereinafter

k, as the maximum value for which the
specialists will privately oer their services. This upper bound will depend on the level
of uncertainty and will be explicitly computed in the next section. As we argued in the
introduction, we will treat physicians as a perfectly integrated collective, therefore, we
will be interested in the aggregate costs of specialization. We will introduce the idea of
capacity in order to reect the fact that the higher the proportion of patients treated, the
more specialists will be needed, by writing the costs per-patient:
k(s  g): (1)
The ability to heal is represented in our model by the level of specialization. The
\healing technology" is the following. For a given severity x 2 [0; 1], a physician with a
specialization z 2 [0; 1]; will perform the following cure (to a patient whose disease is of
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the type for which the physician was trained):
If x  z; the patient will recover her health loss x.
If x > z; the patient will have a partial healing, recovering z.
The concept of partial healing deserves some explanation. We try to capture here the
fact that, even if the physician can not provide a cure, the agent benets from analgesics or
other symptomatic treatments that will make her suer a lower health loss and therefore
gain some life quality. Another way to interpret this assumption is that, even if the
physician is not able to cure the patient, he can give her an ill leave, allowing the patient
to receive the illness subsidy.
The patients have to decide to which health system demand their treatment. They
have two possibilities: the public system, and the private one.
In the public health system the patients incur in no pecuniary costs, but they are
compelled to make a rst visit to the GP. If they need to receive specialized care (that
is, if x > g), they will be sent to the appropriate specialist by the GP, but there is a
cost associated with receiving treatment in a second visit. We will make this explicit by
assuming that the patient will only be able to recover a fraction (1   Æ) of the health
loss that she did not recover in her visit to the general practitioner. Thus, a patient with
severity x > g will receive the following additional benet from the public specialist:
(1  Æ)(x  g) if x  s (2)
(1  Æ)(s  g) if x > s:
That is, if x  s the specialist will have the qualication required to fully cure the
disease, but the patient will not recover all her health as she will incur in the delay costs
(a fraction Æ). Otherwise, (i.e. if x > s) the patient will suer a double cost, rst because
the physician's specialization is not enough to fully heal her, and on the other because of
the waiting costs Æ.
If the patient chooses to go to a private supplier, she will directly visit a specialist,
but, she is uncertain about the specialist she needs to see. Hence, with a probability 
the patient will choose wrongly. If this is the case, she will have to make a second visit,
and incur in delay costs (a fraction Æ; dened as above). In addition to this, the patient
will have to pay the fee the physician sets, that we will denote by w. In order to keep the
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model tractable, we assume that the fee is paid only once. The patient has to pay for the
treatment she receives and therefore she makes no payment if she sees a doctor that does
not treat her.
In this case a patient with severity x receives the following expected health benet
from the private specialist:
(1  )x + (1  Æ)x if x  s (3)
(1  )s+ (1  Æ)s if x > s:
The health benets are undermined by the delay costs associated with the imperfect
knowledge of the patients, and when the severity of the disease exceeds the qualication
of the physician, due to a lack of specialization.
It is important to notice that the treatment possibilities we have shown are only
reasonable for non-urgent illnesses, because otherwise the patient's access to the medical
treatment is made through the emergency rooms and no such \double visit" exists. This
fact makes that although ex-ante we did not impose any restriction on the value of Æ
(Æ 2 (0; 1)), we should be constrained to consider only not very high values. The reason
is that this fraction captures, in some sense, the urgency of the disease, understood as the
need to receive treatment soon to avoid having a great health loss. Therefore, the model
we are presenting is constructed to deal only with non-urgent diseases.
With these healing possibilities, we can now dene the utility that a patient with
severity x will have after she has received medical treatment. Denoting by EU
pub
() the
expected utility obtained from the public system and EU
pri
() the one obtained from the
private, we have, after simplication:
EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
Y if x  g
Y   Æ(x  g) if x 2 (g; s]
Y   (x  s+ Æ(s  g)) if x > s
(4)
EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w) =
8
<
:
Y   Æx  w if x  s
Y   (x  s+ Æs)  w if x > s:
Both functions, EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) and EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w); are continuous and decreas-
ing in x. They are parallel for x > s. The patient will choose the health care provider
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in order to maximize her expected utility, this allows us to characterize the demand ad-
dressed to the private health system in terms of the patient that is indierent between
the two systems (~x). Denote:
~x =
g
1  
+
w
Æ(1  )
: (5)
Lemma 1 The expected demand for private health care on each of the two specialities is:
D(~x) =
8
<
:
1
2
(1  ~x) if ~x  s
0 otherwise.
(6)
The demand for private specialized care is increasing on the delay costs (Æ); it is
decreasing on the qualication of the general practitioners (g), on the uncertainty (),
and on the fee (w).
In the previous lemma we dened the demand addressed to the private system by
means of the indierent agent. Denoting by w(~x) the wage that a patient with severity ~x
is willing to pay to obtain direct access to the specialized medical care, the condition we
found in terms of quantities can be rewritten as follows:
~x =
g
1  
+
w
Æ(1  )
() w(~x)  Æ ((1  ) ~x  g) : (7)
We now dene the specialists' prot function. As we assume the physicians to be a
fully integrated collective, their objective function will include the revenues from both
specialities, this possibility of collusion among the providers of medical services is also
present in the work by Gravelle [13]. In addition, the specialists receive revenues both,
from the patients they treat in the public system, and from their work as private suppliers.
Denoting by 
pub
the prots they receive for their work in the public system, and by 
pri
the ones from their private practice, their expected prot function is as follows:
E(s; ~x) = 
pub
+
pri
= 
pub
+ 2D(~x) [w(~x)  k(s  g)] : (8)
As we said in the introduction, we take as a basis for our study the Spanish case. In
Spain the public physicians do not earn in a pay-per-visit basis, hence the public part of
their revenues is independent of the demand they serve as private providers. We assume
that its value is determined prior to the starting point of our model, and therefore we
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take it as exogenous. If we substitute (6) and (7) into the expression of E(s; ~x) and
rearrange terms, we have:
E(s; ~x) =
8
<
:

pub
+ (1  ~x)[Æ((1  )~x  g)  k(s  g)] if ~x  s

pub
otherwise.
(9)
In order to ensure that the physicians will oer their services as private providers, we
need to consider their participation constraint (PC), formally:

pri
 0) w(~x)  k(s  g)) Æ((1  )~x  g)  k(s  g))
~x 
g
1  
+
k(s  g)
Æ(1  )
: (10)
Finally, we will dene the objective function of the regulator who is interested in
the maximization of total surplus, dened as the sum of expected consumers' surplus plus
physicians' expected prots. We assume that there does not exist any extra cost in raising
public funds. We introduce this assumption only to keep the model tractable, moreover
the qualitative results would not change in the presence of these costs provided its value
is reasonably low. The formal expression of the regulator's objective function is:
TS(s; ~x) =
8
>
>
<
>
:
E(s; ~x) + Y  
R
~x
g
Æ(x  g)dx 
R
s
~x
[Æ((1  )~x  g) + Æx] dx
 
R
1
s
[Æ((1  )~x  g) + Æs+ x  s]dx  (~x  g)k(s  g) if ~x  s
E(s; ~x) + Y  
R
s
g
Æ(x  g)dx 
R
1
s
(x  s+ Æ(s  g))dx  (1  g)k(s  g) otherwise.
(11)
Rewriting the above equation with the help of (9) yields,
TS(s; ~x) =
8
<
:
Y  
R
~x
g
Æ(x  g)dx 
R
s
~x
Æxdx 
R
1
s
(x  s+ Æs)dx  (1  g)k(s  g) if ~x  s
Y  
R
s
g
Æ(x  g)dx  
R
1
s
(x  s+ Æ(s  g))dx  (1  g)k(s  g) otherwise.
(12)
To close the model we assume that the regulator can commit to his strategy before the
physicians take their decisions. This allows us to avoid problems of time inconsistency.
3 Optimal Regulation
In this section we will develop the analysis of the most eÆcient regulation under some
alternative regulatory possibilities. This way, we will be able to spot the most important
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eects that are present in this market. In subsection 3.1, we will present the extreme
situations, namely the completely decentralized and the rst best scenarios. In subsection
3.2, we will study the most plausible situation, the partially decentralized scenario, in
which the regulator controls the specialization choice, but not the private demand the
specialists serve. We will analyze it rst without considering cost subsidies, and afterwards
introducing that dimension.
3.1 Complete Decentralized and First Best Scenarios
We will rst study the complete decentralized scenario. In this case, the physicians
control both variables, the level of specialization (s) and the demand (characterized by
the indierent agent ~x); the regulator becomes passive.
Proposition 1 Under total decentralization, the resulting allocation is:
s
Td
= ~x
Td
=
(Æ   k)g + Æ(1  )  k
2 [Æ(1  )  k]
8k 2 [0;

k); with

k =
(1  g)
(1 g)
Æ:
Notice that, due to the healing technology they are endowed with, the specialists'
demand will always start at a degree of illness that they can completely heal (~x  s).
The individual with the lowest severity they treat is the one that denes the wage (we
do not allow for price discrimination), and this patient is not willing to pay more for a
more qualied specialist as long as the physician is enough specialized to fully heal her.
Therefore, the physicians will not have incentives to specialize themselves more since this
will not have repercussions into the wage they can charge to the intramarginal patients.
As a result of this feature we get that ~x
Td
= s
Td
:
The upper bound

k is the maximum value of the costs for which we have interior
solutions, all through the paper we will restrict ourselves to the domain k 2 [0;

k): This
bound is decreasing in , because the uncertainty is a source of ineÆciency for the private
provision, as it introduces a risk on their performance.
The other extreme scenario is the First Best situation, in which the physicians are pas-
sive and the regulator maximizes social welfare, disregarding the participation constraint
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of the physicians. This situation is unreal but we compute it because it represents the
ideal situation the regulator should aim to.
Proposition 2 The First Best allocation is:
~x
1b
=
g
1  
s
1b
= 1 
(1  g)k
1  Æ
:
The rst consideration that arises from this proposition is the eect of the uncertainty
on the market share. The uncertainty is a source of ineÆciency for the private medical
care hence its optimal demand is decreasing in : Moreover, ~x
1b
> g for all  > 0: This
tells us the important role played in our model by the general practitioners, their screening
behavior is what makes optimal (for every positive level of uncertainty) the coexistence
of both systems of provision. This result provides a rationality for the \Gatekeeping" po-
sition of the GP's, based only on eÆciency considerations. The fact that these physicians
have a more versatile qualication than the specialists, gives them an additional ability
to eliminate the uncertainty of the patients.
As one could expect, we nd that in the total decentralization scenario the physicians
serve a suboptimal fraction of the population, i.e. ~x
1b
< ~x
Td
:
There is an interesting insight concerning s
1b
. The regulator, although the marginal
cost of the specialization is constant (k), is not interested in forming \perfect physicians"
even in the absence of uncertainty ( = 0). On the one hand, contrary to other quality-
concerned goods, medical care presents the interesting feature that, raising the quality
does not benet all the patients. The patients have a utility improvement from an increase
in the quality of the physicians only if, in the previous situation, they suered from
underprovision (in our model this is the case when the physician's specialization was not
enough to heal the disease). But, if they were fully treated (the provision of quality was
enough for them), then a higher level of specialization has no eect on their utility. On
the other hand, raising quality increases the costs of forming every specialist, as there is
a homogenized specialization for all the physicians, except the general practitioners.
Corollary 1 The physicians' specialization in the rst best scenario is decreasing in ;
while it is increasing under total decentralization.
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The intuition behind corollary 1 is clear: as we said before, the presence of uncertainty
is a source of ineÆciency for the specialized medical care, hence it is reasonable that for
a given cost of specialization, the optimal level of qualication decreases as the degree
of uncertainty increases. However, when the physicians are in control, they perceive this
ineÆciency dierently. More uncertainty implies less power to attract patients to
At this point, the reader may consider whether these ineÆciencies we have found in
the totally decentralized scenario are due to the assumption of monopoly power. The
answer is no. If we consider that there is perfect competition in the market for specialists,
we obtain very similar results. On the one hand, under perfect competition the quality
choice of the physicians is ineÆcient and cannot be unambiguously ranked with respect
to the optimal one. On the other hand, the quantity distortion is still present, although
alleviated by the inability to extract prots. As the results do not seem to crucially
depend on this assumption, and we consider that the monopoly structure ts better with
the market we want to analyze, we will proceed with our analysis under the assumption
that the specialists behave integrated as a monopoly.
3.2 Partially Decentralized Scenario
This subsection is devoted to the study of the situation in which the regulator can control
the level of specialization, and the specialists retain the control over the price they charge,
that is, the private demand they serve. We think this case is the most plausible scenario,
the one that ts better with the actual situation of the market for specialized medical
care in the mixed systems. We rst study the case without cost subsidies, and afterwards
we allow for its use.
Proposition 3 Under partial decentralization without cost subsidies, the optimal level of
specialization (s
Pd
), and of private demand for the specialists (~x
Pd
) are:
~x
1b
< ~x
Pd
 s
Pd
< s
1b
:
With ~x
Pd
< s
pd
for suÆciently low values of k:
The specialists, in this scenario, control the demand they serve, and choose to treat
a suboptimal fraction of the population to be able to charge a high wage. Moreover,
this restriction is more important as the level of specialization imposed by the regulator
increases.
This link between quantity and quality distorts the optimal value of s: Even if the
regulator controls the amount of specialization, he faces a trade-o: to impose a high
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standard of quality is costly because it induces a low level of private demand. This leads
to the result s
Pd
< s
1b
: The physicians' reaction is triggered by the specialization cost k
hence, unless the value of k is suÆciently low, the constraint ~x  s will be binding.
Now we will introduce a new variable to the problem, the subsidies to specialization.
We will consider a partially decentralized framework, as the previous one, in which we
allow the regulator to decide what part of the costs of specialization will be publicly
nanced. Notice that this scenario is the one that more closely replicates the actual situa-
tion of the specialized medical care in Europe. The existing systems include a centralized
selection of the level of specialization and subsidies to undertake this process of training.
Let us denote by  2 [0; 1] the fraction of the costs of specialization nanced with
public expenditures. The regulation in this scenario leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under partial decentralization with cost subsidies, the equilibrium is:
a) If Æ 
1
2
and if Æ >
1
2
; 8k 

k(; Æ; g); then:
~x
Pd
> ~x
1b
; s
Pd
= s
1b
; 
Pd
= 1:
b) Otherwise:
~x
1b
< ~x
Pd
= s
Pd
< s
1b
; 
Pd
is undetermined,
with
@k
max
(;Æ;g)
@
< 0;
@k
max
(;Æ;g)
@Æ
< 0;
@k
max
(;Æ;g)
@g
< 0:
The decision to subsidize the qualication of the physicians has important regulatory
eects. The regulator wants highly qualied specialists and a large private supply of
health care. Establishing subsidies to specialization makes (under certain conditions)
both objectives attainable, by breaking the nexus that, in the other scenarios, linked high
level of specialization with small private demand. This nexus was the specialization cost.
The regulator, by subsidizing the specialization intervenes in the market in a more
eective way. In the previous scenario, the public sector was implicitly paying the spe-
cialization costs by ensuring the physicians that their revenues were enough to cover them,
i.e. that their participation constraint was fullled . But with this, the regulator was not
aecting the root of the problem because the specialists still perceived those costs, and
therefore their incentives to charge them to the patients were not altered.
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On the contrary, with the subsidization, the public sector expends resources, but di-
rectly aects the behavior of the specialists by removing the costs from their optimization
program, resulting in a more eÆcient nal allocation.
Notice that the level of specialization obtained when the regulation is possible is in
fact, the rst best level of specialization. Therefore: the use of subsidies to specialization
serves to fully resolve the problem of the level of qualication of the specialized physicians.
Recall that as it is pointed out in Corollary 2, under total decentralization the physicians
can choose to overspecialize. This makes that, depending on the exact conguration of
the parameters, the optimal regulation found here, can be the enforcement of a \quality
ceiling", instead of a \minimum quality standard".
Corollary 3 The level of private demand served under partial decentralization with cost
subsidies (when the use of subsidies is possible) exceeds that of total decentralization.
The importance of corollary 3 is that it shows how by using cost subsidies we improve
over total decentralization also on the quantity dimension. Even though in this scenario
the choice of demand is still decentralized, the presence of subsidies reduces the pressure
of the physicians over the quantity. Now they are willing to treat more patients, as this
will not raise their costs.
The use of the subsidies in the improvement of the regulation although it is restricted
by the value of the parameters is of wide applicability. Numerical calculations show that,
in fact, the range of values for which its use is not possible only has a relevant size for
very high levels of uncertainty or of specialization costs (k).
Moreover, this cost reimbursement regulation is always feasible for values of Æ 
1
2
and,
beyond this threshold, its use possibilities are decreasing in Æ: This brings to place the
reference made in Section 2 about the non-urgent nature of the diseases we are considering.
There, we said that the type of model we constructed, is only reasonable for non-urgent
illnesses, and that, therefore, the value of Æ should be constrained to be not very high.
Hence, both, the range of parameters for which this modelization is natural and the range
for which regulation is possible, seem to be determined by the same condition.
Finally, we would like to say that the results obtained with this model serve to under-
stand the existing situation in the market for specialized medical care. In the countries
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with mixed systems, the process of centralized selection of the amount of specialization
combined with the subsidization of the corresponding costs, can be supported as the
outcome of an optimal process of regulation.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a model to study the specialized medical care in an
economy where public and private providers coexist. We took as a basis the Spanish
case, where the formation of specialized physicians is completely regulated by means of
a program called MIR (Internal Resident Physician), and where the specialists have the
characteristic of being dual suppliers since they work for the public and the private system.
Also this type of situation is present in other European countries like Italy.
Although the specialized medical care is one of the most important aspects of the
provision of medical services, all the research undertaken in this eld seemed to consider
the qualication of the physicians as a given characteristic, and focused on the eect
of dierent pricing policies on the market interaction. Thus, the qualication of the
physicians was completely unattended by the literature. This article is an attempt to
study the acquisition of the physicians' specialization. Moreover, we have been able to
closely replicate the existing situation in the mixed health systems, with an analytically
tractable model.
Our rst contribution is to provide a new explanation for the \Gatekeeping" position
of the General Practitioners based on their wider range of specialization. This versatility
allows them to identify and treat several types of diseases, and therefore decreases the
uncertainty present in the system.
We also spot the possible presence of overspecialization, when the physicians have
control over the private demand they serve and also over their level of specialization.
Even if they have to pay for their qualication, and the specialists do not internalize the
positive eects of an increase of the specialization on those patients who previously were
undertreated, the physicians' reaction to the presence of uncertainty in the market is to
oer highly qualied services to a small fraction of the population.
The most interesting scenario is the one in which the physicians have control over
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the private demand they serve, but the regulator controls the amount of specialization.
This case is specially important because it replicates the situation in the mixed systems
of provision of health care. Our ndings support the spirit of the actual policies as
optimal, even though a more specic study would be necessary for each eld. These
mixed systems are based on a centralized choice of the level of specialization, combined
with an almost complete subsidization of the associated costs; this is proven to be the
best possible intervention, for the main range of parameter values, that coincides with the
most reasonable one in terms of interpretation of the model.
We have chosen to develop our model under an specic kind of incomplete information.
In our setting the uncertainty aects the patients' ability to recognize the type of illness
they suer. With this construction, we have been able to give an interpretation to the
position of the general practitioners in the market. Their wider range of coverage (they
are able to treat patients from any type of disease), makes them become providers of
information, not only worse physicians. Notice that, a patient facing a high uncertainty
has incentives to go to the general practitioner and avoid the costs associated with a visit
to the wrong specialist.
The model we have developed has undoubtedly some shortcomings: the linear struc-
ture we have used for the disease and the costs of specialization is very simple. Neverthe-
less, it allowed us to obtain explicit solutions and provided us with good insights about
the behavior of the agents. Moreover, we think that a more sophisticated construction
would not qualitatively alter the main eects arising in our model.
The uncertainty that is present here is not the only possible type of uncertainty we
can introduce. Also, the patient may not be able to observe the severity of the disease she
has. This kind of incomplete information appears in the models that study the optimal
role for the general practitioners from the perspective of agency theory. These models
confront two situations: one, in which the visit to the general practitioner is voluntary,
and another, where it is compulsory, (a good example of this literature is Garc

ia-Mari~noso
and Jelovac [12]).
Finally, the MIR program we have taken as the basis of our study is, among other
things, a quantity setting device. The amount of physicians that will receive specialized
training in each eld is xed in advance to the selection or matching process, that is based
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on a tournament. The number of positions oered in each speciality should be chosen,
then, taking into account the presumed evolution of the demand, and some supply side
considerations like the retirement of active specialists. This is also an interesting issue
that we did not address. Therefore, a natural extension of this article is to introduce the
amount of free positions as a choice variable, taking into account the possible coordination
failures between the population of potential specialists and the regulator, in the selection
of the eld of specialization.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Due to the equal probability of both illnesses, in expected terms, and for every degree
of severity, half of the population who is ill, will suer from each type of disease. To
characterize the demand, we look for the indierent patient, ~x. To do it we use the fact
that EU
pri
() EU
pub
() is non-decreasing in x, and strictly decreasing for x  s: We have
to study two possible regions. For ~x 2 (g; s] the equality of the expected utilities implies:
EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) = EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w) =) ~x =
g
1  
+
w
Æ(1  )
:
This condition denes the degree of severity from which on the patients will prefer to
go to a private medical supplier, since:
8x > ~x; EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w) > EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ).
To ensure that this is suÆcient to characterize the patients' behavior we need to
consider what happens in the region x 2 (s; 1]. The equality of the utilities implies
EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) = EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w) =) ~x = s:
If for x = s; EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) > EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w); then:
8x  s; EU
pub
(x; g; s; Æ; ) > EU
pri
(x; g; s; Æ; ; w): Recall that for x > s both func-
tions are parallel. Therefore the indierent patient will never be in this region.

Proof of Proposition 1:
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